Research Summary: An Empirical Analysis of Chain Reorganizations and Double-Spend Attacks on Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies


  • The first comprehensive exploration of blockchain reorganizations (reorgs), which can occur as a result of bugs, network attacks, or conventionally through a network’s natural consensus process.
  • These events are difficult to monitor as the reorged version of the chain is discarded by the node. Lovejoy provides a new method for detecting transaction reordering events against live cryptocurrencies.
    He also evaluates the most significant double spend attacks and provides a potential strategy for counter attacking.


Lovejoy, James. “An Empirical Analysis of Chain Reorganizations and Double-Spend Attacks on Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies”


Core Research Question

  • What impact do deep blockchain reorganizations have and what can projects do to mitigate the impact of such events in an adversarial environment?


  • Nakamoto Consensus is a consensus protocol designed to solve the “double-spend” problem, where an adversary spends the same cryptoassets twice, thereby reversing payments that the recipient already considered settled and irreversible, in an event called a Blockchain Reorganization, or reorg.
  • “Miners” in Nakamoto Consensus (often called “proof-of-work”), are economic agents that continuously perform a computationally expensive lottery in which they compete to append new transactions to a shared ledger, a blockchain, in return for payment in the form of newly minted coins and transaction fees.
  • A miner’s probability of winning the lottery is equal to its proportion of the total Hashing Power being used by all miners. Thus, security from double-spending relies on a key assumption that adversaries are unable to control greater than half of the total hashing power.
  • If this assumption does not hold, an adversary could launch a “51% attack”, in which they use their majority to rewrite settled transaction history or censor transactions from users or other miners.
  • For many years this assumption persisted unchallenged until a large number of additional cryptoassets were launched, each being mined with much less computational power than Bitcoin.
  • Combined with the introduction of Mining Rental Markets where miners can outsource their computation to the highest bidder, the assumption that a 51% attack is realistically impossible no longer holds for many less prominent cryptoassets.
  • Challenging this assumption, theorists have since designed models to explain the incentives against double-spend attacks in a world where computational power for mining is available in a liquid market.
  • Since 2018, multiple alternative cryptoassets have been successfully 51% attacked in practice, with millions of dollars having been disclosed as double-spent in media reports.
  • Despite the central importance of Nakamoto Consensus to the security claims of a majority of the cryptocurrency market, scarce empirical research has been performed to understand the nature of 51% and double-spend attacks in practice.


  • Despite the central importance of Nakamoto consensus to the security claims of a majority of the cryptocurrency market, scarce empirical research has been performed to understand the nature of 51% and double-spend attacks in practice.
  • Reorganizations or “reorgs”, events in which one suffix of transactions is replaced by another in the transaction history, are transient such that one must observe them in the moment. This is because the ledger only commits to a single, linear list of transactions without branches and discards any alternative transaction histories that may have been proposed in the past.
  • It is thus not possible to determine whether a reorg occurred by retroactively analyzing the transaction history. Therefore, until this research, the field’s understanding of 51% attacks was limited to media reports, exchange disclosures and theoretical models.
  • In order to bring empirical data to this discussion, the author implemented a module that analyzes reorgs for double-spent transactions. The monitoring detected three previously unreported likely double-spend attacks on Bitcoin Gold, Vertcoin and Litecoin Cash. The author was the first to publicly disclose the attacks.
  • One of these events allowed the author to confirm for the first time the existence of counterattacks as a viable strategy for defending against a profit-driven adversary.
  • Another event provided strong evidence that mining rental markets are being used to carry out 51% attacks, and the viability of active pool monitoring as an early-warning system for impending attacks.
  • The third event allowed him to identify deficiencies in a variation on Nakamoto Consensus that was originally intended to prevent attacks but failed to do so in practice.
  • Finally, Lovejoy presented evidence for miner-executed double-spend and front-running attacks against Ethereum smart contracts.


  • To collect information on mining pools and reorg incidence, the author designed a new system called the “Reorg Tracker” that monitors cryptocurrency networks to detect, save and analyze reorg events in real-time.
  • Lovejoy analyzed the dataset in aggregate form to present empirical data on the frequency and severity of reorgs between coins, predominantly by analyzing mining pools operators through a popular mining protocol called Stratum:

  • The author then combined the reorg data with historical price and mining rental market data for each coin to estimate the costs of reorgs.
  • He then used that information to provide empirical evidence for the accuracy of the theoretical models of attack cost.


  • Using the aforementioned module, the author was able to collect detailed information on blockchain reorganization event count, depth, impact and cost:

  • Further, Lovejoy found that average reorg frequency is inversely correlated with 1) coinbase issuance 2) block interval, but reorg severity is uncorrelated with the 2.
  • The results also show that for every coin studied, the compensation offered to miners per hour is significantly lower than the transaction volume in the same period, which plays a role in reorg incentivization.
  • Less than half of the cryptocurrencies studied have an abundance of computational power available on the open market to rent for mining, which confirms the theory that mining rental markets are a viable method for launching attacks.
  • They also found that the value of mining rewards is a good approximation of the real-world marginal-cost investment required to append to the ledger for many coins.
  • Finally, Lovejoy found that the 51% attacks detected were likely to break-even or were profitable even without considering the double-spend.

Discussion & Key Takeaways

  • Are cryptoasset developers responsible for engaging in counter-attacks in the event of a 51% attack?
  • Can hashrate rental marketplaces offer a reliable method for counter-attacks?
  • Is this approach less centralized than the existing attack mitigation approaches, such as block header timestamps?


  • This research is applicable to consensus development research, as it evaluated trade-offs with the ability to reorganize chain state.
  • It is also applicable as a framework to build network monitors and increase the awareness of reorganization events.
  • Beyond consensus development, cryptoasset projects can use the methodology described here to potentially revert 51% attacks through counter-attacks.
1 Like

An interesting anecdote: the heuristic described in the paper can be used to detect 51% attacks before they take place.

Last year, the developers of Bitcoin Gold were notified that there was a shadow chain in the works. Before the attacker could broadcast the 51% chain, the BTG Core developers were able to invalidate it by issuing a custom patch that basically tells every node in the network to trust a specific block hash for a given block height (which essentially rejects any version of the chain other than the “trusted” one relayed by the BTG devs).

Even though the patch was celebrated, it is very much a centralization vector. If core devs can dictate which version of the chain to trust, it opens up a can of worms.


That is an interesting anecdote! Maybe this is asking for too much speculation, but what might be a solution to preventing the attack without the centralization worry?


That’s a great question @zube.paul.

Beyond centralization, the fundamental problem with block hash checkpoints is that they also become single points of failure.

If, for example, a core maintainer’s git keys are compromised, an attacker could use it to release a new version of the client that grants them absolute power over the network.

For networks without sufficient security budgets to make such attacks cost-prohibitive, the best solution is to instruct users to reject the shadow chain through custom RPC calls. That way, users can see what their nodes are rejecting in a more transparent (and optional) fashion.