Discussion Post: A Stable Legal Framework for Digital Uniqueness

CTA: “In these threads, we attempt to further the discussion of a key problem in this category and evolve our understanding of the domain space where research work has not yet answered the specific problem or question being considered. These posts are living documents, and it is our hope that the community will continue to contribute to their structure and content.”

Fairfield, Joshua, Tokenized: The Law of Non-Fungible Tokens and Unique Digital Property (April 6, 2021). Indiana Law Journal, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3821102

Key Problem / Topic Area

The author identifies existing legal frameworks through which NFTs can be adjudicated as personal property instead of intellectual property.

Specific Question or Problem Statement

Do the expectations of NFT buyers align with the legal conditions outlined in Terms of Service agreements associated with centralized NFT merchants?

Approach / Methodology

The author is establishing the legal frameworks in which NFTs can be adjudicated as sales of personal property instead of licensing of Intellectual Property.

Background

Check out our previous discussions of Tokenized: The Law of Non-Fungible Tokens and Unique Digital Property.

Part one covering Creating Digital Uniqueness, described the technological components of an NFT and gave an introduction to the different treatment of personal and intellectual property under the United States Uniform Commercial Code.

Part two, Existing Legal Frameworks and Problems, delved deeper into the legal frameworks governing various types of assets, and gave a history of how digital assets became entwined with intellectual property. Consumers cede many of their rights under an intellectual property framework, often without realizing it, so NFT consumers may be better served by a more familiar property-oriented definition of their rights.

The author refers to the following recent cases in Part Three:

Rensel v. Centra Tech - A case in which the Southern District of Florida was attempting to determine if a buyer who had purchased a cryptocurrency by paying Ether into a smart contract was bound by the terms of agreement in arbitration that appeared on the seller’s website. The court ruled that since the buyer interacted with the smart contract directly, the terms of arbitration on the website did not apply to the agreement between buyer and seller since the smart contract was the point of sale.

Capitol Records v ReDigi - A case in which a website attempted to create an aftermarket for used digital audio files under the condition that the original user gave up ownership of the original copy. The court ruled that the website did not have the license to resell the audio files and were thus violating the IP rights of the license owners. The court ruled that the destruction of the original copy did not negate the process of copying and transmitting the file, which violated the copyright agreement associated with the original IP.

The court affirmed the holding that Redigi’s service created a new copy of a sound recording, and the reproduction right is not subject to the first sale doctrine, which applies solely to a particular phonorecord. The court declined to weigh in on whether Redigi engaged in a distribution of a phonorecord through its service. The court rejected Redigi’s argument that its technical process of deleting the original copy of the file in the course of reselling a sound recording does not constitute a reproduction, holding that the deletion does not nullify the fact that a reproduction has been made. The court rejected ReDigi’s fair use argument, finding:

(1) under the first fair use factor, the reproduction is not transformative or add nothing new, and that, given the total absence of transformative purpose, the commercial motivation weighs against a finding of fair use under this factor;

(2) the second fair use factor plays no role here;

(3) the copying of the entire digital file disfavors fair use under the third factor; and

(4) “Factor Four weighs powerfully against fair use”, in particular, because, unlike used physical copies, “used” digital files are identical to “new” digital files, and thus Redigi’s marketplace directly competes with Plaintiff’s primary market.

Weighing the factors together, and relying heavily on the Second Circuit’s TVEyes decision, the court concluded there was no justification for fair use here, saying “Even if ReDigi is credited with some faint showing of a transformative purpose, that purpose is overwhelmed by the substantial harm ReDigi inflicts on the value of Plaintiff’s copyrights through its direct competition in the rights holders’ legitimate market, offering consumers a substitute for purchasing from the rights holders.”

Finally, the court rejected the policy-based arguments made by copyright law professors in an amicus brief supporting ReDigi that the first sale doctrine should be applied broadly to protect ReDigi “to vindicate purchasers’ ability to alienate digital copyrighted works under the first sale doctrine—emphasizing that §109(a) is styled as an entitlement rather than a defense to infringement—without regard to technological medium.” The court concluded, “If ReDigi and its champions have persuasive arguments in support of the change of law they advocate, it is Congress they should persuade. We reject the invitation to substitute our judgment for that of Congress.”

The following sections of the Uniform Commercial Code are also pertinent to the discussion of NFTs as personal property:

Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § Article 2: Sales - The set of codes outlining the standards for the regulation of sales, warranties, and how exchanges of goods and services in the United States are regulated.

UCC § 2 - 204: Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 - Section 204. Formation in General

(1) A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.

(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.

(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.

UCC § Section 2-207: Battle of Forms - This occurs when a buyer and seller have different terms of agreement during the process of an executed transaction. Legal precedent nullifies any terms that are not found in both contracts as being unagreed upon terms. In this case, if no terms are agreed upon then the standard rules surrounding exchange of goods under UCC apply. If the deal involves anything other than goods, then common law rules apply. If the deal is between merchants, then once an offer has been made, any new or additional terms included in the acceptance of that offer become part of the final agreement unless: The offer limits acceptance to only its own terms, the responding party objects to the additional or different terms within a reasonable time, or the additional or different terms materially alter the terms of the offer. If neither party is a merchant, then any differing conditions of the offer are incorporated into the contract unless there is a condition of the other party’s agreement to all terms, in this case constituting a rejection of the offer and a counter-offer taking its place.

UCC § 2-206(3) Common Law Mirror Image Rule - In contract law, a doctrine requiring any acceptance to be an unconditional assent to the terms of the offer. Thus, at least historically, any acceptance had to embrace the pricing and other information included in an offer, or there would be no binding contract. In modern commercial settings, a binding contract is often recognized despite minor discrepancies between the offer and acceptance. For instance, under the Uniform Commercial Code, a clearly expressed acceptance can create a binding sales contract even if the acceptance contains added or different terms when compared to the offer.

UCC § 2 - 207: Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2. Section 207: Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation (2)

Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation -

(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.

(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants, such terms become part of the contract unless:

(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;

(b) they materially alter it; or

(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.

(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such a case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.

UCC § 2 - 314 Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 - Section 314 Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade -

(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section, the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.

(2) Good To be merchantable must be at least such as

(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and

(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and

(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and

(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and

(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and

(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.

(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise from the course of dealing or usage of trade.

UCC § 2 - 315 Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose -

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.

UCC § 2 - 403 - Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchase of Goods; “Entrusting”.

(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has the power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though

(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or

(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or

(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a “cash sale”, or

(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.

(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.

(3) “Entrusting” includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor’s disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.

[Note: If a state adopts the repealer of Article 6-Bulk Transfers (Alternative A), subsec. (4) should read as follows:]

(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9) and Documents of Title (Article 7).

[Note: If a state adopts Revised Article 6-Bulk Sales (Alternative B), subsec. (4) should read as follows:]

(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Sales (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7).

[Note: As amended in 1988.]

Conclusions / Key Takeaways

The researcher suggests that regulations associated with sales of personal property should be applied to NFTs to create a digital personal property class. This new class would complement intellectual property and physical property as a means of aligning sales in collecting markets with buyers’ expectations.

CTA: Future Work / RFP

The researcher suggests that a more stringent assessment of End User License Agreements would make it more likely to push platforms to align their recognition of NFTs as personal property to ensure that NFTs achieve their potential in creating a new digital personal property asset class, instead of falling into licensing terminology, regulations, and practices.

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What are the potential drawbacks of defining NFTs as personal property? To me, it would seem like it might restrict some of the benefits of them such as paying artists a share of each sale. What about connecting more complex types of contract to an NFT, like real estate – would you be able to put a mortgage on an NFT deed?

@Benton what do you think?

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I am not sure royalty payments to artists are any more protected by NFTs and blockchain sales than they are by a specialized organization like BMG or ASCAP. The current structure of royalty payments come from accumulated sales and listens which are reported by centralized entities. While the notion of decentralizing this system seems to be beneficial for artists, decentralizing the process opens up even more room for exploitation through copying and counterfeiting so while there is a decentralized network on which artists can sell their own works, there is no real enforcement agency to prevent counterfeiting and theft resulting in the artist not benefitting anyway.

Artists currently have a better legal framework for protecting their royalties going through traditional channels than through NFTs. While the promise for NFTs and getting artist royalties is there, the practical application for deploying the technology to ensure protection for artists works simply isn’t there. NFT sites usually leave the due diligence to the seller, and thus the sites are NOT guaranteeing they will protect the artists’ ownership.

Honestly, an NFT for a piece of property sounds like a terrible idea. For one, property is divisible. The notion of an “indivisible” and “non-fungible” digital tracker for a plot of land sounds terribly incongruous with how mortgages and land titles function. If I owned an acre or hectare of land, and a single NFT represented that land, would I have to create two NFTs if I wanted to split the land into two plots and sell one? There are some contracts and structures that would be made unnecessarily complex by NFTs being added, which would likely induce what is known as “Braess’ Paradox”. In Braess’ Paradox, adding more complexity to a system can cause it to slow down. In the case of mortgages and land title exchanges, NFTs might actually make the process take much longer due to the nature of what occurs when land title ownership is exchanged.

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Paul Ennis at UCD has a nice article about the artist Damien Hirst (of $10mm diamond-studded platinum skull fame) and his $2000 microdot NFTs. The author is selling an option to either destroy the physical or NFT component of the work within a year. Damien Hirst's 'The Currency': what we'll discover when this NFT art project is over

For some added context: https://www.damienhirst.com/texts1/series/spots (his spot paintings)

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I am looking at the Damien Hirst NFT printing and wondering how this will affect the market. On the one hand, having an artist with a big name will likely draw attention. On the other hand, this feels like a Warhol-esque exploitation of art collectors in which Hirst is taking the ridiculous notion of paying $2000 for a “unique item” and creating thousands of “unique items” with no real individual character. In effect, he is “mass producing uniqueness”. This is a paradox. I am not sure the result of Hirst’s experiment will have the desired effects, unless he is trying to expose the paradox that uniqueness cannot be mass-produced without undermining said uniqueness.

Honestly, the whole Hirst thing feels like “Exit Through the Gift Shop” but the crypto version.

How long before we see Dadaist NFTs that are created with the explicit intention to be burned?

I believe until we see the first Dadaist NFT “art” work, we won’t know if this is a genuine “art” movement or another coy attempt at exploiting art collectors.

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Hi @Larry_Bates ,

Truly a fascinating read. I can tell these discussions are still in their respective “infancies” and I’m curious to see how NFT laws are built upon in the future.

Regarding UCC § 2 - 403, I’m uncertain as to how current NFT acquiring platforms/services do not already express a version of “entrusting”. Do NFT markets not already functionally exhibit this? (Or is this more so included to showcase the need for standardized literature around a “digital personal property” class?)

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Thank you for this fantastic question! The easiest way to answer that question is to simply point to one of the platform’s ToS and illuminate the relevant clauses. For example on Opensea:

"OPENSEA IS A PLATFORM. WE ARE NOT A BROKER, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, OR CREDITOR. THE SERVICES ARE AN ADMINISTRATIVE PLATFORM ONLY. OPENSEA FACILITATES TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE BUYER AND SELLER IN THE AUCTION BUT IS NOT A PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BUYER AND SELLER OF CRYPTO ASSETS OR BETWEEN ANY USERS.

YOU BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR VERIFYING THE IDENTITY, LEGITIMACY, AND AUTHENTICITY OF ASSETS YOU PURCHASE ON OPENSEA. NOTWITHSTANDING INDICATORS AND MESSAGES THAT SUGGEST VERIFICATION, OPENSEA MAKES NO CLAIMS ABOUT THE IDENTITY, LEGITIMACY, OR AUTHENTICITY OF ASSETS ON THE PLATFORM."

Effectively, this clause places Opensea as a third party platform that is NOT a broker. In other words, even though Opensea provides the platform for exchanges and trades of NFTs to occur, they are ACTIVELY asserting that they are not the broker and by proxy have no legal responsibility to ensure that the owners are in fact the owners of the property being sold or that the terms of an agreement are actually “agreed upon” by both sides.

Compliance on Opensea is voluntary. In that regard, they are actively not enforcing any set of rules or standards to assert that they are not the responsible party. This is a reason it is so important to read ToS. Opensea APPEARS to be a broker, but explicitly states that they are not operating as such. By proxy, it would have to be shown that a buyer/seller were operating under the same laws and standards to establish commercial laws are in fact applying. In that regard, we can’t even be assured that all Opensea participants are even in the United States, thus their transactions cannot be determined to be adjudicated by US standards until a plaintiff or defendant emerges in a specific case.

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thanks for this summary @Larry_Bates .
The value of NFTs often must suit financial, lawful, and contractual guidelines, that differ relying on where the deals are struck. In most cases, jurisdictions base their NFT copyright policies on European Research Council rule no. 721 (ERC-721) blockchain smart contract standard. Under this standard, creators and owners of unique crypto assets (UCAs) can verify the digital scarcity of their possession by recording it on the Ethereum public distributed ledger, where UCAs can be stored and transferred.
Regardless, some questions linger over the relationship between artists, collectors, investors, and licensors.Since these artworks have subjective value and cannot be sold off in pieces (the essence of “non-fungibility,”) the question of how NFT transactions should be controlled, taxed, and policed remains unanswered(if there has been a change kindly correct me). Other questions surround the affinity between an NFT backing an asset and the asset itself. Unlike cryptocurrencies, which are regulated by financial regulations, the asset itself. Unlike cryptocurrencies, which are regulated by financial regulations, the assets associated with NFTs contain aesthetic value as well as monetary clouding the regulatory waters and subjecting them to consumer protection, truth-in-advertising, and other aspects of the law in addition to IP and investment law.
Got a couple of questions :

  • Can, and if so, how, can an NFT’s asset value be distinguished from its inherent value?
  • How should the transfer – sale, donation, inheritance – of NFTs be regulated and * treated for tax purposes?
  • What rights do NFT owners have, vis-à-vis the original creation on which the NFT is based?
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Thank you for these questions! I will start in reverse order to address the foundational issues that affect the rest of the questions. That is: what rights do NFT owners have? The answer is relatively none. Unless there is an explicit statement of licensing agreement or some statement of explicit transfer of intellectual property; the purchase of an NFT does not grant any rights beyond those that are granted with purchasing anything from a third party. The transfer of NFTs should be treated as property and should be regulated as such, in that they are explicitly not transmitting rights of ownership over the license with a general NFT purchase.

Can an NFT’s asset value be distinguished from its inherent value? Technically they are already distinguished from each other in that the asset from which an NFT is derived will ultimately be able to be leveraged separately from the NFT itself. Suppose you are talking about speculative value vs. value on the market. In that case, an NFT listing price will not necessarily reflect the last market sale of an identical or similar NFT and thus the market value should be assessed by the last sale and not the list price.

A great example of the confusion that initially surrounded the rights associated with NFT purchases is in the SpiceDAO. Due to the confusion surrounding rights associated with NFT sales, the SpiceDAO was formed with the intention of purchasing a physical copy of Jodorowsky’s planned Dune film to procure funding to make the film and then digitize and burn the physical copy to increase the value of the NFT. Since the people involved failed to understand copyright law and IP law associated with the purchase they were making, ultimately the SpiceDAO significantly overpaid for a physical copy of a book that had already been digitized for public access. To make matters worse, simply purchasing the book did NOT give them the rights to make a film based on the book. This becomes the prime example of what NFTs do NOT represent when purchased. A purchase does NOT necessarily transfer ownership of the license, does NOT give the buyer the capacity to make derivative works of the NFT, and ultimately does not necessarily represent ownership of the IP associated with the NFT.

The same holds true for physical art works. Purchasing a physical artwork does not give the purchaser the right to make derivative works without express permission of the creator. In example, I cannot buy a comic book off the shelf or from an auction and go make a movie or television show based on that book simply because I own it. This is not an exhaustive example, but it gives a tangible piece of media that is also intellectual property that shows why a simple purchase of property does not equate to the purchase of the rights to the intellectual property from which that work was derived.

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Thank you @Larry_Bates for this wonderful summary. I believe that treating NFT as a personal property doesn’t take it away from the ambit of intellectual property and the copyright and royalties that follow. This is because, intellectual property from my understanding is a special kind of personal property albeit intangible ( these types of personal property are called choses in action). I am

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Right, OpenSea is not a “broker” the same way that Uber is not a “taxi” company. It wouldn’t surprise me if SEC and probably the FTC will soon be giving DEXs the evil eye based on the concept of functional equivalence. There was a case where a DeFi protocol attempted to waiver all liability but SEC pointed out that the smart contracts could only be executed via their UI/UX. As Gesler says, if you look like a duck, walk like a duck and quack like a duck, claiming to be a chicken is not going to cut any feathers with him. Even if you get every legal adult to sign in triplicate and swear on their mother’s grave that they are using it as 3rd party platform, competition law might infer implied terms , impute vicarious liability, or have courts bring in equitable restitution (unjust enrichment etc). In short, when playing regulatory chicken in the gray zone, someone is going to get run over sooner or later without clear safe habors and some decent caselaw.

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Just like @Larry_Bates has said, when it comes to legal treatment, a purchaser’s rights depend a lot on whether the NFT in question has an underlying physical asset. Where there is an underlying physical asset, a purchaser’s rights will be limited by the existence of the physical version.

Concerning NFTs existing solely in digital form, I would like to say that the problem is not that it is impossible for digital assets/content (which mostly embody intellectual property) to be transferred in the same way as tangible goods are, but that it had unfortunately become conventional for such transactions to be treated as licenses rather than sales transactions even where the circumstances suggest otherwise. This indiscriminate use of end user license agreements (EULA) is therefore the first impediment to the application of the first sale doctrine in digital asset/content transactions.

The decision in ReDigi is another hurdle because it holds that the first sale doctrine does not apply to digital subject matter. This means that even if a transaction was couched as a sale rather than a license, the doctrine would not apply as long as its subject matter is digital. This decision was based on the technology available at the time and will become unjustifiable if it can be proven that there are effective ‘forward and delete’ or similar technologies which ensure that once a digital work is forwarded, it is irretrievably deleted form the sender’s device. In the case of NFTs, this problem is solved by the digital uniqueness provided by blockchains, along with their consensual nature.

It is generally necessary and particularly in relation to NFTs, that the indiscriminate use of licenses be discouraged and contracts be treated like sales transactions where the circumstances suggest so. Since blockchain technology guarantees digital uniqueness of NFTs, a digital first sale doctrine should apply. This would make NFTs sui generis (of its own type).

Property is described as a bundle of rights comprising of different individual sticks (privileges). The wholesale use of licenses therefore entails the risk of permanently eroding the possibility of enjoying full property rights.

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Concerning NFTs existing solely in digital form, I would like to say that the problem is not that it is impossible for digital assets/content (which mostly embody intellectual property) to be transferred in the same way as tangible goods are, but that it had unfortunately become conventional for such transactions to be treated as licenses rather than sales transactions even where the circumstances suggest otherwise.

Property theory (anglo-saxon) has two major branches, choses in possession (real-prop, chattels etc) and choses-in-action (court enforced privileges and immunities). The first sale doctrine came about because copyright fixes the IP into a tangible work so then people treated it like choses-in-possession, with all the ancillary rights like rental, etc. However due to its underlying intangible nature, courts and later legislation had to enumerate fair dealings and customary practices (backups etc). The underlying IP is still a contractual “license” which has morphed from shrink-wrap to click-wrap to now touch-wrap (for smart-contracts by mere act of interaction). So the sales analogy is flawed because if you presume the NFT is a limited edition of some sort, what happens during the transaction is a change of control via a unilateral novation agreement. I believe there’s an EIP standard which attempted to define change of control rather than a token flow. This resolves your conundrum between sale and relicense. The usage/derivative rights are fixed upon minting, but the control rights can be onsold (eg one-off right to convert limited edition to print-version … perhaps on payment of another royalty). This makes it analogous to the Canadian (electronic) exhibit and subsequent purchase of fine art.

It is generally necessary and particularly in relation to NFTs, that the indiscriminate use of licenses be discouraged and contracts be treated like sales transactions where the circumstances suggest so. Since blockchain technology guarantees digital uniqueness of NFTs, a digital first sale doctrine should apply. This would make NFTs sui generis (of its own type).

Here I refer you to evolving theory of a new root of property … choses- in-rem which UK has issued a consultation paper (they label it data objects). In my mind, it has close analogies with international law of the sea where you can staple writs to the ship which otherwise moves between jurisdictions. Data Objects can be seen in proto-forms, eg the ICOTERM paper based terms of carriage. I believe caselaw consistently refer to rights over the documents rather than the goods in question. So rather than sui generis, you’d just elaborate on an imperfect usufruct (google roman law) for avatar celebrity rights or exhibition of collectables.

If interested in discussing the refactored legal property theory, jump onto LexDAO #ip-*** channel. You’d find that the new pluri-national nature of choses-in-rem can solve a lot of conflict of laws (fair-use/dealings EU limits, etc)

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Thanks @drllau. You are right about my sales analogy missing the distinction between control rights and usage/derivative rights. I think the analogy would be limited to instances where control and usage/derivative rights are bundled together. I hope we can have further engagements on this topic.

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I hope we can have further engagements on this topic.

Let’s also keep in mind that I come from the Anglo-saxon jurisprudence PoV whereas the US has gone on a different emphasis (Hohfeld analysis = bundle of interests) plus the liability regime. Whereas property rights (of which digital have distinct non-rival economic aspects) in Commonwealth follows Yanner v Eaton in

“property” does not refer to a thing; it is a description of a legal relationship with a thing. It refers to a degree of power that is recognised in law as power permissibly exercised over the thing.

recognising 3 elements

  1. First, the existence of an asset, thing or resource to which a power or right can relate.
  2. First, the existence of an asset, thing or resource to which a power or right can relate.
  3. Third, the right of a person either to exclude or allow access by another person to that particular asset, thing or resource

wrt digitalisation, for 1. we need some degree of persistence, and identity/naming (eg URI)
2. can be relaxed, with human liberty constrained by agency theory and thus dematerialised / delimited by control aspects within unilateral contracts
3. digital rights can be non-rival and either excludable or not unlike choses in possession.

So rather than argue the techicalities of IP vs license vs personalty, digital property is reasoned from the social value and legitimate power in a network of relationships. That’s why I call avatar NFTs an imperfect usufruct because you have the tree (creator crafting a set of accepted usage) and the fruit (trading of avatars and self-identity). Which is distinct from art collecting and separate again to hash certification. NFT is a mere technical standard but you need to study the customary usage of any choses in rem (digital objects), rather than treating NFTs as a single class.

And let’s not forget EU civil law and PRC has their own property definitions/doctrines (eg collective rights). India seems to be a hodge-podge to my eyes (God’s have legal personality?) so perhaps a local might be more qualified to speak.

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Wearing my finance hat, I am not convinced that NFT has an intrinsic value. The process for analyzing an NFT valuation is not predetermined. Simply put, NFTs cannot be evaluated using the same parameters that you would use to evaluate private companies or traditional investment vehicles like shares where the last buyer’s payment typically provides some indication of the worth. However, with NFTs, it can be challenging to predict what the subsequent buyer may pay based on their predictions. As a result, estimating the value of an NFT is based on speculation.

Recently, the market has developed a number of algorithms and metrics to determine the worth of an NFT, including its rarity, tangibility, social proofs, creator’s history, etc. These measurements, in my opinion, are subjective and serve only as a means for the market to assign a value to something that has little to no intrinsic value, which may suggest that an NFT’s value is significantly influenced by the health and strength of the community (market) that supports it. It will be fascinating to know that, according to Adam Smith’s inquiry into the wealth of nations, an asset’s worth is determined by the labor utilized in the asset’s production and the accessibility of the market where the value will be distributed and utilized.

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It will be fascinating to know that, according to Adam Smith’s inquiry into the wealth of nations, an asset’s worth is determined by the labor utilized in the asset’s production and the accessibility of the market where the value will be distributed and utilized.

So if you deduct the sale price of say a Gucci bag (or Porsche) from the raw time & materials, then what do you call the “gap”? You can buy (donate) your way to a knighthood but can you purchase a nobel laureat title? There is a class of economic goods (Veblen/Giffen) which are not governed by supply/demand and totems (general class of symbols, identity socio indicators, etc) fall into this. If you strongly identify as a cyberpunk, or dumb apeshit or whatever, then it is worth whatever you think it is to belong to that group? Every parent probably been pestered by teens wanting to own the “in-crowd” knic-knac of the month.

Now the price discovery mechanisms are fascinating because it is inherently non-linear dynamics, eg the halo effect of wanting to imitate your “hero”. So some things are “kool” until they are not. This is not the normal “price” of supply/demand of commoditities/goods but of personalty & intangibles. Adam Smith neo-classical theory did not factor in celebrity because apart from pope/royalty it just wasn’t on the table his century.

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Veblen analysis strikes me as correct. The economy dynamics associated with them are “strategic sabotage” not value maximization.

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Could you expand on the idea of strategic sabotage here? Are you suggesting that the game here would be to drive the price down to achieve the status without the high price of that status? Would it be possible to engage in a market manipulation to do this also, something like a negative wash trading?

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@Larry_Bates I delved deeper into your discussion post. I made a brief summary of it and further the discussion by contending that it will be impossible to treat NFT as personal property in a bid to circumvent certain obstacles that flows from intellectual property, because intellectual property right is a fundamental right which inures naturally to an owner of artwork. This is in fulfilment of my cohort assignment.

In this research, the author argues that Intellectual property arrangement for non-fungible token does not provide purchasers with sufficient ownership interests that have been promised. It is always a bad buy by them and this may be a result of the technology power of the vendor or its legal power through a license claw back. The author thus, contends that the best legal characterization of Non-Fungible Token is as a sale of personal property since it matches the commercial expectations of Non-fungible Token consumers.

The author referred to several cases such Rensel v. Centra Tech-where a Southern District of Florida attempted to determine if a buyer who had purchased a cryptocurrency by paying Ether into a smart contract was bound by the terms of agreement in arbitration that appeared on the seller’s website. The court ruled that since the buyer interacted with the smart contract directly, the terms of arbitration on the website did not apply to the agreement between buyer and seller since smart contract was the point of sale. In Capitol Records v ReDigi - A case in which a website attempted to create an aftermarket for used digital audio files under the condition that the original user gave up ownership of the original copy. The court ruled that the website did not have the license to resell the audio files and were thus violating the IP rights of the license owners. The court ruled that the destruction of the original copy did not negate the process of copying and transmitting the file, which violated the copyright agreement associated with the original IP.

The author also cited several sections of the Uniform Commercial Code to support his discussion of Non-fungible Token as personal property such as article 2, section 204 of Uniform Commercial Code which outlines regulation for sale of goods, warranties and how exchanges of goods and services in the United States are regulated amongst others.

While the author’s arguments and suggestions are creative and disruptive, the author failed to establish how and to what extent the recognition of Non-Fungible Token can extinguish the intellectual property rights of the owner which inures naturally as a compensation for effort, creativity and originality injected into making the Non-Fungible Token. The author also did to consider the economic and creative implications of not recognizing Non-Fungible Token as personal property, and the fact that intellectual property is also recognized as a personal property.

It is my considered opinion that recognizing or treating intellectual property as a personal property does not and will not extinguish intellectual property rights that naturally flows from a Non-Fungible Token to the vendor. A sale of personal property is a sale of goods not the intellectual property in the goods and will be counter-productive if the court were to turn blind eyes in making this distinction since doing so will amount to deny of fundamental huma right. Intellectual property rights are recognized as a fundamental human right which cannot be wished away at whims.

Further, treating Non-Fungible Token as a personal property instead of intellectual property may impact creativity and innovation deployed in making it which may have consequences to the market.

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